Engineering Business Process through Accountability and Agents by Baldoni, Matteo et al.
Engineering Business Processes
through Accountability and Agents
Extended Abstract
Matteo Baldoni
Università di Torino, Dipartimento di
Informatica, Italy
Cristina Baroglio
Università di Torino, Dipartimento di
Informatica, Italy
Olivier Boissier
Laboratoire Hubert Curien UMR
CNRS 5516, Institut Henri Fayol,
MINES Saint-Etienne, France
Roberto Micalizio
Università di Torino, Dipartimento di
Informatica, Italy
Stefano Tedeschi
Università di Torino, Dipartimento di
Informatica, Italy
KEYWORDS
Accountability; Responsibility; Multiagent Organizations; JaCaMo.
ACM Reference Format:
Matteo Baldoni, Cristina Baroglio, Olivier Boissier, RobertoMicalizio, and Ste-
fano Tedeschi. 2019. Engineering Business Processes through Accountability
and Agents. In Proc. of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2019), Montreal, Canada, May 13–17,
2019, IFAAMAS, 3 pages.
1 RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
AS ENGINEERING CONCEPTS
A business process (BP) is “a set of activities that are performed
in coordination in an organizational and technical environment.
These activities jointly realize a business goal.” [26]. In general, a
business goal is achieved by breaking it up into sub-goals, which
are distributed to a number of actors. Each actor carries out part of
the process, and depends on the collaboration of others to perform
its task. Multiagent Systems (MAS), in particular models for MAS
organizations (MAO), are promising candidates to supply the right
abstractions for describing BPs; however agent organizations still
lack a systematic way to properly handle feedback of the execu-
tion of business processes in terms of good or bad functioning (e.g.
exceptions). When a fedback occurs, the agent which can handle
it (or which is interested to know), may be not the same agent
who triggers the feedback. To make the overall system robust, the
feedback should be reported to the agent with the proper means
for treating it. In [2] a proposal was made to use accountability and
responsibility relationships to state the rights and duties of agents
in the organisation, given the specification of a normative organi-
zation. Building upon this work, we have studied how robustness
can be achieved via accountability and responsibility relationships,
and we used these concepts as tools to systematize and guide the
design and development of the agents. It is worth noting that ac-
countability and responsibility are not primitive concepts. Rather,
they are properties that emerge in carefully designed software sys-
tems. Thus using them as engineering tools means that we actually
constrain the ways in which software is designed and developed.
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We then exemplified how such concepts can be engineered in a
JaCaMo MAO, where agents execute under a normative organiza-
tion expressing BPs as accountability and responsibility relations
among agents. Specifically, we considered the OMG Incident Man-
agement scenario [21]. The case models the interaction between
a customer and a company for the management of a problem re-
ported by the customer. The customer reports the problem to a Key
Account Manager who, on the basis of her experience, can either
resolve the problem directly or ask for the intervention of first-level
support. The problem is, then, recursively treated at different sup-
port levels until, in the worst case, it is reported to the software
developer. Generally, the business aim of the process (to solve the
reported problem) is decomposed and can be distributed over five
BPMN processes, whose execution requires their interaction and
coordination. Noticeably, as always with BPs, the way in which
goals are achieved matters, so agents are expected not only to fulfill
their assigned goals but also to respect the BP: the “goal” is that the
process takes place [1].
Goal distribution over a group of BPs bears strong similarities
with proposals about MAO. For what concerns software modu-
larity, both suffer from some limitations. By focussing merely on
the achievement of the assigned sub-goals, agents loose sight of
the overall process, and ignore the place their achievement has
within the organization. The relationship between each level of
support and the following one, in the example, is emblematic: when
a request of support is made, an answer containing some kind of
feedback on the realisation of this support is expected in order to
proceed. However, since processes are independent, one cannot
give for granted that another will answer. It follows that when a
process does not answer, the waiting one may get stuck indefinitely.
Similarly, MAOs (e.g., [11, 14]) allow the functional decomposition
of complex, organizational goals, and the assignement of subgoals
to agents. The coordinated execution of subgoals is often supported
by a normative specification, by which the organization issues obli-
gations towards the agents, e.g. [8, 12, 13, 16]. However, agents
may operate in ways that do not fit into the process specification
and, importantly, when agents fail, the organization has no explicit
mechanism for sorting out what occurred, for a redress.
This is where accountability [3–6, 10, 17, 18] and responsibility
[5, 23, 25, 27] come in handy. Accountability “emerges as a primary
characteristic of governance where there is a sense of agreement
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and certainty about the legitimacy of expectations between the
community members.” [15]. In particular [18], accountability im-
plies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of
standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities
in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they deter-
mine that these responsibilities have not been met. It presupposes
a relationship between power-wielders and those holding them ac-
countable, where there is a general recognition of the legitimacy of
(1) the operative standards for accountability and (2) the authority
of the parties to the relationship (one to exercise particular powers
and the other to hold them to account). BPs represent an agreed
behavior, introduce expectations on the behavior of the interact-
ing parties, and require some kind of governance in order for the
process to be enacted, but the accountability results hidden into
some kind of collective responsibility (“many hands problem”). As a
consequence, the governance of the system is compromised as well
as its functioning as a whole. This is what we aim at overcoming.
2 ENGINEERING MAOWITH
ACCOUNTABILITY/RESPONSIBILITY
Since accountabilities and responsibilities imply some obligations
[18], we can realize them in JaCaMo by relying on the deontic
primitives that such framework provides. In other words, the fitting
projection over rolex (see [2]) can bemapped into a number of Jason
plans of the agent playing role x by way of the following patterns,
expressed in AgentSpeak(ER). Specifically, the fitting relationship
represented by each pair ⟨R(x,q), A(x,y, r ,u)⟩ in Rx ⇝ Ax , is
mapped into an AgentSpeak(ER) g-plan as follows:
+!be_accountable(x , y, q) <: drop_fitting(x , y, q) {
// Well-Doing e-plan
+obligation(x , q) : r ∧ c <- bodyq .
// Wrong-Doing e-plan
+oblUnfulfilled(x , q) : r ∧ c ′ <- bodyf . }
Such that: (1) bodyq satisfies the fitting-adherence condition (see
below); (2) bodyf includes the sending of an explanation for the
failure from x to y. The two e-plans encode the proactive behavior
of an agent assuming a responsibility. Until the responsibility is not
dropped, the agent starts reacting to obligations in accordance to
the accountability specified in the fitting. The agent will perceive,
through the identity that is provided by the organizational role
it plays, certain events as events it should tackle through some
behavior of its own, but it will also be aware of its social position
both (1) by knowing some other agent will have the right, under
certain conditions, to ask for an account and (2) by including specific
behavior for building such an account.
Well-doing e-plan: is triggered when the specified obligation is
issued by the MAO. The context expression, r ∧ c , is satisfied when
condition r activating the agent accountability holds together with
some possibly empty local condition c to choose among alterna-
tive plans, i.e., multiple ways to achieve a same result in different
(local) circumstances. Due to the accountability fitting the agent
has accepted, the body of the plan(s) (bodyq ) must, then, be such
to satisfy the responsibility assumption represented by the pair
⟨R(x,q),A(x,y, r ,u)⟩. That is, the plan body has to satisfy a fitting-
adherence condition, by which there must exist an execution of the
plan body that, restricted to the events that are relevant for the
progression of u, is an actualization of the responsibility q. Intu-
itively, q is actually used for fulfilling the obligation. In this case,
the obligation to give an account for the satisfaction of the obliga-
tion is implicitly resolved by satisfying the very same obligation.
It is interesting to note that the accountability fitting is not only
a functional specification of the organization, but it also specifies
the “good” behavior of the agents. It is in fact this characteristic
that justifies our programming patterns, that enriches the standard
JaCaMo [9].
Wrong-doing e-plan: allows the agent to provide an account when
it did not complete its task. The triggering event, oblUnfulfilled, is
generated by the MAO when an obligation is left unsatisfied. The
context has the same structure as above;bodyf produces an account
of the failure. This will be an explanation that the agent produces
and that some other agent will use to manage the exception and to
resume the execution. The correct use of the pattern guarantees,
by design, that exceptional events, when occurring, are reported to
the agents who can handle them properly. Accountability fulfills
this purpose because, by nature, it brings about an obligation on
the a-giver to give an account of what it does.
The engineering of accountable JaCaMo MAOs involves that:
(1) Each process is mapped to an organizational role; (2) A scheme
representing the overall process goal is defined (its successful exe-
cution corresponds to the achievement of the process goal; (3) For
each activity to be performed in sequence, a subgoal is added to the
scheme by means of the corresponding operator; (4) For each struc-
tured block including a concurrent execution, the corresponding
goals, grouped by the parallel operator, are added to the scheme; (5)
for each choice all the schemes representing the possible courses
of action should be defined. They will be instantiated dynamically
by the agents, depending on their internal choices.
3 CONCLUSIONS
The systematic application of the proposed patterns makes agents
aware of the process as characterization of the goal. Hence, account-
abilities provide the programmer with a behavioral specification
the agent has to satisfy. The proposal moves MAOs closer to other
paradigms where exceptions are handled. In the actor model [19],
for instance, when an actor cannot handle an exception, it reports
the exception to its parent actor, which decides to either handle the
exception or report it further up. In an agent-based system such a
scheme is not directly applicable because agents are independent
entities, and show no parent-child relationship. Approaches for
modeling exceptions in a MAS setting have been proposed (see, e.g.,
[20, 22, 24]). However, no consensus has been reached on the use
of such a concept in agent systems. The main problems rise when
trying to accomodate the usual exception handling semantics with
the properties of MAS; namely autonomy, openness, heterogeneity,
and encapsulation. Accountabilities can fill this gap.
Commitment-based protocols, e.g. [28], as well as NorMAS [7],
provide alternatives for modeling coordination. A detached commit-
ment is an obligation on the debtor to bring about the consequent.
In case of violation, the creditor has the right to complain against
the debtor but cannot hold the debtor to provide an explanation.
This lack of information hampers both the understanding of what
has occurred, and attempts of recovery from the failure.
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